



[BACKGROUND FILE ON '77 WORKING-GROUP STUDY,

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: 16-BRECKINRIDGE / SSC FINAL REPORT

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

[illegible]

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

SECRET

INTRODUCTION

Lee Harvey OSWALD first came to the ~~Agency's~~^{CIA's} attention upon receipt of AIRGRAM no. 1301, dated 31 October 1959, from the United States Embassy in Moscow, in which it was stated that OSWALD had appeared at the Embassy on 31 October to renounce his American citizenship. He stated that he had applied in Moscow for Soviet citizenship after his arrival in the Soviet Union on 15 October. The first public reference to OSWALD appeared in the Washington Post of 1 November 1959.

On 2 November 1959, the FBI liaison officer requested ^{what} a trace be run on Lee Harvey OSWALD in the ~~Agency's~~^{CIA's} central holdings. ^{The} ~~his~~ response on 4 November was negative.

Because of the counterintelligence implications of OSWALD's action, the Counter Intelligence Staff opened an official file on Lee Harvey OSWALD to accommodate biographic information developed by the Agency in response to a Department of State inquiry, dated 25 October 1960, on a list of American defectors in Soviet Bloc countries. OSWALD's name was one of those appearing on the list. CIA forwarded an interim reply on 3 November 1960; a final reply on 21 November 1960. Until early October 1963, the contents of the OSWALD file held by CIA consisted entirely of press clippings and reports disseminated by the Department of State, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of the Navy.

On 8 October 1963, the CIA Station in Mexico City ^{reported} ~~received~~ ^{was informed that} ~~information from a reliable source to the effect that~~ "an American named Lee OSWALD had contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City on Tuesday, 1 October 1963. He had spoken in halting Russian to the Soviet Embassy guard, Ivan Ivanovich OBYEDKOV, to whom he said he had visited the Embassy two days earlier, on Saturday, 28 September. He asked whether there had been a reply to a telegram that the Consul with whom he had spoken, but whose name he could not recall, had promised to send to Washington."

OBYEDKOV had attempted to establish the identity of the Consul with whom OSWALD had talked: if it had been a dark person, then it had probably been [Valeriy Vladimirovich] KOSTIKOV. OBYEDKOV, after checking with Soviet consular personnel, assured OSWALD the telegram had been sent to Washington but no answer had been received."

~~The station forwarded this information to the State Department.~~
~~It was received in Headquarters on 9 October. [MEXI-6453 (IN 36017), 9 October 1963.]~~ A file check on 10 October by Agency personnel in Washington revealed the possibility that the Lee OSWALD who had spoken with OBYEDKOV, and presumably with KOSTIKOV, and Lee Harvey OSWALD, the defector, were the same person.

On 10 October 1963, CIA Headquarters disseminated by cable [DIR 74673, 10 October 1963] the report in substantially the form and detail given above, to government agencies whose jurisdictional interests had been established by a review of OSWALD's file: the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of State, the Department of the Navy, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. A comment was included in the report noting the likelihood that Lee OSWALD was probably identical with the former marine who had defected to the Soviet Union in 1959. [Comment: For some unexplained reason, OSWALD's statement that he had been to the Soviet Embassy two days before on 28 September 1963 had not been included in the dissemination.]

On the same day, 10 October 1963, CIA Headquarters sent to the Mexico City Station a lengthy cable summary [DIR 74830, 10 October 1963] of the background information held in the Headquarters' file on OSWALD. The Mexico City Station was instructed to pass the substance of its 9 October report to the local representatives of the same U.S. Government agencies and departments that had been the information in Washington.

According to Agency files, the above information was passed in Mexico City on 16 October to the Legal Attache as well as to the Ambassador, the Minister, the Counselor for Political Affairs, the

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best were believed to involve
the same caller who identified
himself as Lee Oswald on 1 October

President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy.]

Between 10 October and 22 November 1963 there ^{is no record} ~~appeared to be~~ ~~no~~ requests from recipients of the 10 October dissemination for further information or follow-up investigation.

On 22 November 1963, after the news of the assassination had reached Mexico City, the Station initiated a review of all voice intercept ^{and} ~~and~~ photographic coverage of both the Soviet and Cuban Embassies. This review of voice intercept transcripts conducted by the monitor and other Station personnel turned up other ~~transcripts~~ conversations ~~on~~ on 27 and 28 September and on 1 October 1963. These transcripts were reported to Headquarters on 23 November 1963. [MEXI-7023 (IN 67108), MEXI-7025 (IN 67188), and MEXI-7033 (IN 67232).]

From this review by the Station it became evident that OSWALD had also visited the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City and had talked there with a clerk, a Mexican national, named Silvia DURAN. After the assassination and the publicity about Lee OSWALD, Silvia DURAN had told a number of relatives and friends that she had talked to OSWALD about a Cuban visa. Silvia DURAN and her husband, Horacio DURAN Navarro, were detained and questioned by the Mexican police from 23 to 25 November 1963.

After giving some of the details of her own personal background - she was an admitted leftist sympathizer and had formerly worked for the Mexican-Cuban Institute of Cultural Relations - Silvia DURAN said that when she first heard of the death of President Kennedy she had been depressed and thought the assassin must have been a maniac. When she learned he was associated with the "Fair Play for Cuba Committee" she did not believe it.

When she learned the name of the assassin was Lee OSWALD she remembered he was the man who had come to the Consulate about two months before to get a visa to pass through Cuba on his way to the Soviet Union. She realized that he had said he was married to a Russian and that he had belonged to the "Fair Play for Cuba" group. She checked her file on him in the Consular Archives and

from the description of OSWALD, she was sure it was the same man. OSWALD was denied a Cuban transit visa because he did not yet have a Soviet visa, and he was told to get the Soviet visa first, but it was noted that this would require about four months. She had asked the Cuban Consul himself, Eusebio AZCUE, to talk to OSWALD and they had an argument when AZCUE urged OSWALD to leave Mexico instead of waiting there. The Consul had phoned the Soviet Consulate and talked to the person handling OSWALD's visa request, who had said it would take about four months to hear from Moscow about the Soviet visa. The same afternoon, OSWALD had come back again and she had told him the same thing. She gave OSWALD a slip of paper with her name and telephone number on it in case he ever got his Soviet visa. He did not call back, she said.

Silvia DURAN was reinterrogated by the Mexican police from 27 to 29 November but she did not change or add materially to her story about OSWALD.

It is known that the Cuban Ambassador in Mexico, Joaquim HERNANDEZ Armas, reported on the detainment and interrogation of Silvia DURAN by the Mexican authorities. The Cuban Government also sent the Mexican Government a stiff note of protest, which the Mexican Government rejected.

On 26 November, the day after DURAN's release, Cuban President DORTICOS queried HERNANDEZ about his report. HERNANDEZ confirmed that there had been an altercation between OSWALD and Consul AZCUE. DORTICOS made a persistent but unsuccessful effort to determine from HERNANDEZ whether the Mexican authorities had threatened Silvia DURAN so that she would make a statement that the Consulate "had given money to that American". HERNANDEZ's response was that nothing of that sort had happened. [MEXI-7068 (IN)], 26 November 1963; HMMA-22545, 29 November 1963]

The CIA follow-up investigation produced the following confirmed results which have a bearing on Silvia DURAN's account:

a. 27 September. In mid-afternoon, Silvia DURAN infor-

- 5a -

med the Soviet Embassy that a male American citizen had requested a visa to transit Cuba on his way to the Soviet Union. She desired to know with whom the American had spoke at the Soviet Consulate. Also she indicated that

6
- 8 -

the Cuban Consulate could grant him a visa and arrange immigration details if the concession of a Soviet visa were assured.

b. 27 September. Pursuant to her inquiry, Silvia DURAN received a confirmation from the Soviet Embassy that the American had been to the USSR installation. He had shown them a letter from the Soviet Consulate in Washington indicating that he had been long awaiting a visa for himself and his wife to go to the USSR. No answer had come from Washington; however, the waiting period was sometimes four or five months. The American also had a letter attesting that he was a member of a pro-Cuban organization but he had claimed that the Cubans would not give him a visa unless he had already received a Russian visa.

Although the American was still at the Cuban Consulate Silvia DURAN repeated that she could not give him a transit visa unless a Soviet visa was forthcoming, notwithstanding the American's wish to go to Cuba to wait there for his Soviet visa. According to DURAN, the American knew no one in Cuba and she intended to make an appropriate annotation on the American's card. The Soviet official echoed her statement that the American was not known.

c. 28 September. Silvia DURAN was again visited at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City by the American seeking a Cuban transit visa. Mrs. DURAN contacted at least two members of the Soviet Embassy and facilitated a direct conversation between one of the Soviets and the American. Speaking in poor Russian, the American stated that he already had been to the Soviet Consulate and had left an address. The Soviet official replied that he was aware of that. The American suggested that he had not known his address then, and he had gone to the Cuban Embassy to ask for the address, because they had it. The American then

acceded to the Soviet official's invitation to come by and give them the address.

d. 1 October. In mid-morning an unidentified individual speaking broken Russian, contacted the Soviet Military Attache in Mexico City. He said he had been to the Embassy the previous Saturday (28 September) and had talked with a Consul who had said they would send a telegram to Washington: had there been a reply? He was referred to the Consulate for the information.

~~These additional materials were promptly disseminated in Washington by the CIA to the White House, the Department of State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. [Out Teletype no. 84915, dated 23 November 1963; CSCI-3/778,826, dated 23 November 1963.]~~

It is believed that the Soviet official with whom OSWALD dealt in Mexico City was Consular Attache Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV, born on Moscow, 17 March 1933. In his letter of 9 November 1963 to the Soviet Consulate in Washington, OSWALD wrote about his "meetings with Comrade KOSTIN [sic] of the Soviet Union in Mexico City, Mexico". There is no official of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City with a name resembling "KOSTIN", other than Consul KOSTIKOV.

KOSTIKOV was the senior officer of five Soviet Consular representatives who dealt with visas and related matters. There was firm evidence for the conclusion that KOSTIKOV was a Soviet State Security (KGB) officer, and the other four Consular officers were also known or strongly suspected of being Soviet State Security personnel serving under official cover.

KOSTIKOV was believed to be a member of Department Thirteen of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB. Department Thirteen is responsible for executive action, including sabotage and assassination. Its headquarters, according to a very reliable information conducts interviews or, as appropriate, file reviews on every foreign military defector to the USSR to study and to deter-

- 7 -

mine the possibility of utilizing the defector in his country of origin.

[Comment: OSWALD's contact with a known KGB officer, particularly ^{considered initially by CIA as} an officer of the 13th Department, was ~~an indication to the CIA~~ ^{possibly indicating} ~~that OSWALD went to Mexico City for more sinister reasons than~~ ^{merely} to obtain travel documents allowing him to pass through Cuba on his way to the Soviet Union. ^{Therefore, CIA} ~~devoted a great deal of time and effort in trying to make a determination as to whether OSWALD, as the assassin of President Kennedy, might have been acting in the capacity of a witting agent of a foreign power.~~ ^{The extensive} ~~As a result of a thorough review and study of all available material,~~ ^{provided no evidence} ~~to prove that OSWALD had been acting under direction of the KGB.~~

The Agency also examined all available information in an attempt to determine the exact nature of his contacts with the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City. The Agency was equally unsuccessful in uncovering any evidence that OSWALD's contacts with personnel of the Cuban Consulate had any other motive than to obtain a transit visa for Cuba.

^{wanting to travel} OSWALD's reasons for ~~traveling~~ ^{to} the Soviet Union have never been satisfactorily determined.]

*Comments on quotations from Book V,
The Assassination of the President
President John F. Kennedy, Performance of
the Intelligence Community*

"The evidence indicates that Lee Harvey OSWALD was in Mexico City from 27 September 1963 through 2 October 1963. On October 10, 1963, Bureau Headquarters was provided with a copy of a CIA cable which stated that 'Lee Henry OSWALD' [sic] had been in contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City on September 28, 1963. 36

Footnote no. 36: CIA cable from Mexico Station to FBI Headquarters 10/10/63; memorandum from LEGAT, Mexico City to FBI headquarters, 10/18/63.

All the information that the FBI had prior to November 22, 1963, on OSWALD's activities in Mexico City came from the CIA. On October 3, 1963, the CIA Mexico Station reported to Headquarters that OSWALD had been in contact with the Soviet Embassy. On October 10, 1963, CIA passed this information with some background material to the Navy, the State Department, and the FBI. The Mexico Station made a similar distribution to FBI and State Department officials in Mexico. Since OSWALD was an American citizen, and since FBI was the responsible agency, disseminating this information ended CIA's responsibility in this matter.

[V.92]

Comments on
~~Errors in~~ above quote from Book V:

a. The CIA dissemination of 10 October 1963

[DIR 74673] to the FBI, Navy, and State, made no mention of OSWALD's contact with the Soviet Embassy on 28 September 1963. Although this information had been reported to Headquarters by MEXI 6453 (IN 36017), 9 October 1963, the action desk neglected to include in its dissemination that in addition to OSWALD's telephone call to the Soviet Embassy on 1 October, OSWALD had mentioned that he had visited the Soviet Embassy on 28 September 1963.

b. On 8 October 1963, not 3 October, the CIA Mexico Station reported to Headquarters that OSWALD had been in contact with the Soviet Embassy. The cable was received in Headquarters on 9 October 1963.

c. The Mexico Station made a similar distribution to FBI and State officials in Mexico on 16 October 1963. This memorandum addressed to the Ambassador with copies to The Minister, the Counselor for Political Affairs, the Regional Security Officer, the Legal Attache, the Naval Attache, and the I&NS representative included

the statement that "This office determined that OSWALD had been at the Soviet Embassy on 28 September 1963 and had talked with Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV, a member of the Consular Section, in order to learn if the Soviet Embassy had received a reply from Washington concerning his request."

"96. It is also instructive to note that CIA Director John McCONE telephoned FBI Director HOOVER on the morning of November 26, 1963, and after noting that the President wanted to make sure the CIA was giving the FBI full support, specifically offered to make 'CIA's operational resources in Mexico' available to the Bureau.

"The Committee has seen no evidence that the FBI asked the CIA to conduct an investigation or gather information on the assassination case, but middle-level CIA personnel did routinely provide the Bureau with information that came to their attention in the assassination case."

[Footnote 96, page 39, V]

Coment: Herewith an incomplete list of requests from the FBI for assistance and information from the CIA. The list speaks for itself.

26 November 1963

Subject: Richard Thomas GIBSON.

(Paraphrase) During the afternoon of 26 November INANITION/17 passed to the FBI representative in Bern a report (quoted in full in the cable). The FBI representative immediately notified ELMARD (P) and after discussing the content of the report it was agreed that ELMARD would contact INANITION soonest. ELMARD emphasized the utmost importance the US Government attached to follow-up of this matter. ELMARD received prompt answers to initial questions and arranged to meet with INANITION/20, INANITION/6 in company with the FBI representative in Bern.

[BERN 2492 (IN 68312), 26 November 1963]

28 November 1963

Subject: Rumored \$5,000 bank deposit made by OSWALD upon return from Mexico on 3 October 1963.

The FBI has just levied on us an official request for full information on source and origin of rumor about five thousand dollars bank deposit.

[DIR 85654, 28 November 1963]

28 November 1963

Subject: Interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO.

The FBI liaison officer (S. PAPICH) officially advises that the FBI requests CIA turn ALVARADO over to Mexican authorities and that CIA request the Mexican authorities to interrogate ALVARADO in detail.

FBI reports that it understands that the Mexican authorities have a capability of polygraphing and requests that CIA request Mexican authorities that he be polygraphed.

The FBI expressed a desire to have the results of the interrogation as soon as possible and that the Legal Attache be kept advised of developments.

[DIR 85665, 28 November 1963]

29 November 1963

Subject: Ricardo SANTOS

Mr PAPICH referred me to DIR 85665, 28 November 1963. He referred to the fact that there is a report that the Third Secretary of the Cuban Embassy in The Hague, Ricardo SANTOS, has a pro CASTRO brother in the United States. He stated that he would appreciate our checking our files or taking such other steps as may be indicated to provide the Bureau with the identity of the brother said to be in the U. S.

[Memorandum from CI/SIG to Chief, WH/3, 29 November 1963.]

9 December 1963

Subject: Chinese Communist and CASTRO Plot.

At 0900 on 9 December 1963 Mr. PAPICH of the FBI called and advised that the Bureau had a communication from their Miami field office setting forth information which had been received in a memorandum from our office in Miami concerning a report which had been received from a Western diplomat alleging that the assassination of President Kennedy was the result of a plot prepared and executed jointly by the Chinese communists and CASTRO through intermediaries.

Mr. PAPICH stated that the Bureau would like to evaluate this information if possible. . . . He said the Bureau was very much interested in identifying the source and it would appreciate any information we can give on where and how this diplomat got this information since it would help the Bureau to evaluate this information. He said that the Bureau would find the

3

identity of the source and possible access to the source, if in this country, most helpful.

[Memorandum for the Record, dated 9 December 1963; Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.]

18 December 1963

Subject: Nomenclature of Weapon possibly owned by Lee Harvey OSWALD.

On 18 December 1963 a representative of your Bureau requested clarifying information about certain Soviet nomenclature believed to refer to a firearm once possessed in the Soviet Union by Lee OSWALD.

We were asked to determine what kind of weapon this might be.

[CSCI-3/779,225 to the FBI, dated 19 December 1963; Subject: Nomenclature of Weapon possibly Owned by Lee Harvey OSWALD.]

7 January 1964

Subject: Jack L. RUBY

Mr. Carlos VILLA, Miami, Florida, furnished to the FBI on December 21, 1963, a letter which had been forwarded to a friend of his named Jose Antonio Juan. Mr. Juan had received the letter from his son living in Cuba.

In the letter the statement was made, "it is known here that RUBINSTEIN was here a little less than a year ago visiting a Mr. PRANSKI, owner of a shop dealing in tourist articles, located on Prado Street between Animas and Trocadero, opposite the Sevilla Biltmore."

It is requested that, through available sources of your Agency, you develop any information possible relating to the above quoted statement in an effort to resolve the allegation that Jack L. RUBY has possibly visited Cuba since 1959 and has connections there.

[FBI Memorandum to the DDP, dated 7 January 1964; Subject: Jack L. RUBY.]

9 January 1964

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD

Attached is a copy of a memorandum from the Federal Bureau of Investigation on Lee Harvey OSWALD dated 31 December 1963 and an enclosure to the memorandum containing names and addresses found in OSWALD's address book and other papers at the time of his arrest in Dallas, Texas. It will be noted that the Bureau has asked us to

- 4 -

determine whether any of the listed names, addresses or telephone numbers have in the past been connected with the Soviet intelligence services.

[Memorandum for Chief, OS/SRS, dated 9 January 1963; Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.]

14 January 1964

Our Chief of Station in Mexico dispatched cable [MEXI- (IN 98273)], advising of a request on the part of the Legal Attache for the development of information concerning one Daniel SOLIS' knowledge of ROJAS, whose name appears to be Ylario ROJAS Villanueva, a 31-year old Mexican citizen residing in Guadalajara, and information concerning the names of Cubans appearing in an alleged notebook said to be in the possession of SOLIS, and an alleged official of the American Government said to have been in contact with OSWALD in Cozomei, named Albert LNU.

[Memorandum for the Record, dated 15 January 1964; Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.]

7 February 1964

Subject: Eladio ROJAS Villanueva.

The Legal Attache in Mexico City would prefer that the COS tell Luis ECHEVARRIA, acting minister of gobernacio, name of subject and that with ROJAS' agreement plan to give him a polygraph and promise ECHEVARRIA a brief statement of the results of the test.

The Legal Attache in Mexico City would prefer have the polygraph given in Mexico City; he could, if CIA strongly prefers, get their headquarters' and subject's agreement to go to Texas.

[MEXI-8117 (IN 15081), 7 February 1964]

12 February 1964

Legal Attache (in Mexico City) requests the following additional questions be put to Daniel SOLIS:

- a. Verify if SOLIS has received two letters recently from Eladio ROJAS Villanueva aka Eladio VILLANUEVA regarding notebook.

5

b. Ask SOLIS to forward notebook if found to:

Mr. Edwin O. JOHNSON, Consulado Americano, Guadalajara, Jalisco.

c. Letters in possession of VILLANUEVA indicate he was in Cozumel with Daniel SOLIS for at least three months in 1963. Can SOLIS recall dates?

d. Ask SOLIS if VILLANUEVA was in contact with Cubans or Americans while in Cozumel. Ask him how VILLANUEVA occupied his time.

[MEXI-8194 (IN 18129), 12 February 1964.]

25 February 1964

Subject: Jack L. RUBY.

"It would be appreciated if you could promptly advise of any information available to you to tend to verify this travel by RUBY."

[Memorandum to Mr. Winston M. SCOTT, dated 25 February 1964, from Clark D. ANDERSON, Legal Attache (Mexico City); Subject: Jack L. RUBY.]

13 April 1964

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD's Access to Classified Information about the U-2.

"Reference is made to your letter, dated 13 April 1964, captioned 'Lee Harvey OSWALD, Internal Security - Russia - Cuba', and to the attachment which contained statements made by one Eugene J. HOBBS, HMC, USN. Your letter requested certain information regarding subject's Marine assignment at the Naval Air Station, Atsugi, Japan, in 1957 and 1958."

[Memorandum for Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, dated 13 May 1964, from CIA.]

- 6 -

10 June 1964

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

"It is believed this allegation that OSWALD was in Tangier, Morocco, should be investigated and you are requested to conduct the necessary inquiries, if possible, to resolve the allegation. Inasmuch as it appears that the President's Commission contemplates the issuance of its report in the near future, it is believed this matter should be handled expeditiously."

[Memorandum to Director, Central Intelligence Agency: Attention: Deputy Director, Plans, dated 10 June 1964, from Director, FBI.]

28 July 1964

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

"In view of the foregoing factors, it would be appreciated if you would review material available to you concerning the activity of Radio Moscow in an effort to identify the two-minute broadcast referred to by OSWALD in the aforementioned documents.

"We would also appreciate advice as to the telephone number in 1959 and the current telephone number of Radio Moscow and we would appreciate advise as to whether or not telephone number V 36588 was listed in the 1959 Moscow Telephone Directory.

"

"It would appear to us that if OSWALD participated in a radio program for Radio Moscow, this fact would have been known to the KGB and a reference to such participation would likely have

been contained in OSWALD's KGB file. . . .

"It would be appreciated if you would question NOSENKO in light of the foregoing observations.

In this regard it is suggested that NOSENKO not be informed of OSWALD's possession of the name, address, and telephone number of Lev SETYAEV."

[Memorandum for Director, Central Intelligence Agency; Attention: Deputy Director, Plans; Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD - Internal Security - Russia - Cuba; from Director, FBI.]

"The [FBI] supervisor also testified that he never had the opportunity to question 'D'. On the morning he arrived* in Mexico City, the CIA turned 'D' over to the Mexican police and denied the supervisor's repeated requests to interrogate 'D'. He learned that the Mexican police had exhaustively interrogated 'D' and that he had recanted his allegations."

Footnote states that "However, the FBI-Mexico City Legat later had access to 'D' and interrogated him."

[V.43]

NB: The supervisor arrived in Mexico City on 27 November and left on 1 December 1963.

Comments: According to MEXI-7124, 28 November 1963, ALVARADO was turned over to the Mexican Ministry of Government at 1630 Washington time on 28 November 1963. This move was made in accordance with FBI's request on 28 November 1963 to Headquarters that the Mexican City Station turn ALVARADO over to Mexican authorities. [DIR-85663, 28 November 1963]

The inference of this quote from Book V is that CIA used obstructive tactics to prevent the FBI supervisor from having access to ALVARADO. The authors, however, do mention, in a footnote, that the Legal Attache did gain access to ALVARADO, but this tactic does not remove the unspoken allegation from the main body of the text that the CIA had been obstructive.

The Mexico City Station files show that the Station and the Legal Attache worked closely together.

In fact, DIR-85661, 28 November 1963, tells the Station that Larry KEEMAN from FBI now in Mexico. He was sent especially to follow up leads on the entire assassination. Headquarters asks that the Station "cooperate with him fully".

"On December 1, 1963, CIA received information that a November 22 Cubana airlines flight from Mexico City to Cuba was delayed some five hours, from 6:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. E.S.T., awaiting an unidentified passenger. [68] This unidentified passenger arrived at the airport in a twin-engined aircraft at 10:30 p.m. and boarded the Cubana airlines plane without passing through customs, where he would have needed to identify himself by displaying a passport. The individual travelled to Cuba in the cockpit of the Cubana airlines plane, thus again avoiding identification by the passengers. [69]

Footnote nos. 68 and 69: Cable from CIA Headquarters to Mexico Station, 12/1/63.

[V. 60-61]

Comment: The 1 December 1963 is in error. Also the hours cited in the above paragraph are not exact. The footnote refers to a Headquarters cable dated 1 December 1963. This cable is also incorrect. The cable in question, DIR 86054, is dated 30 November 1963. It reads as follows:

"Hqs has received report that on day of

President Kennedy's assassination (22 Nov)

Cubana aircraft delayed its departure Mexico

City five hours from 1700 to 2200 awaiting

important passenger who arrived Mexico City

Airport in private twin-motor aircraft at

2130 hours Mexi time. Passenger transferred

directly to Cubana plane without going through

customs or immigration. Travelled in pilots

cabin to Havana."

Headquarters went on to say that the information came from a

KMULCER diplomat who had been a passenger on the same plane to

Havana. Headquarters asked the Station to attempt an identifica-

tion and to determine the reason for such unusual actions at the airport.

The Headquarters cable is included in the OSWALD official file;

and a copy is also in the Mexico City Station files. There is no indication anywhere that anything was done in response to Headquarters' requirements.

"On December 3, CIA Headquarters first received information from the Mexico Station on a Cuban-American. According to Passport Office records, his file there was checked on December 4 by a representative of the CIA. This CIA representative testified that he could not recall such a check or the report." (CIA Liaison Officer Testimony, 5/7/76, p. 9.)

"On December 5, the Mexico Station cabled that a source saw the Cuban-American board a flight from Mexico City to Havana reported that he 'looked suspicious'. It also reported what was then known about his itinerary."

[V.30]

Comments: According to a Memorandum for the Record, dated 10 December 1963, from CI/SIG, "It was subsequently determined through Mrs. ROMAN of Liaison, who checked the records of Passport Division of the Department under the passport number and name as given in IN-72615 [MEXI-7216] that the subject in this instance is in fact a person other than the one cited by the Bureau. The subject of interest by reason of both name and the number of the passport is shown in the Department of State Passport records as Gilberto POLICARPO Lopez."

On 5 December, the Mexico Station did cable that Gilberto LOPEZ "departed as only passenger on Cubana flight on night 27 November for Havana." There was no mention that he "looked suspicious". This information appears in a Memorandum for the Files dated 5 December 1963, from Willard C. CURTIS, i.e., "On 3 December 1963 LITEMPO/4 reported that one Gilberto LOPEZ, U. S. citizen who arrived in Mexico on 23 November 1963, 'looked suspicious'."

This small point does not, perhaps, mean much except to underline the sloppiness of the authors of the report in setting down the facts.

"102. The evidence also establishes that there was confusion as to which U.S. agency was conducting the investigation in Mexico. Although the Ambassador and high-level government officials in Washington believed that the FBI was conducting the investigation in Mexico, the FBI's position was that, although the FBI would cooperate, only the State Department and CIA have jurisdiction in getting investigative results abroad'. (Memorandum to A. Belmont, 11/27/63.)

"Ironically, neither the Legat nor the Bureau supervisor sent down to 'direct and coordinate the the investigation' knew whether the State Department or the CIA was in fact investigating in Mexico." [V.40, footnote no. 102.]

Comment: I don't believe this statement. The FBI had the primary responsibility for the investigation in the United States and because of the FBI position in Mexico, the Legal Attache conducted investigations there; however, he worked closely with our Station relying upon us for matters which clearly fell within our responsibility for foreign intelligence.

The inference here is that there was confusion as to who was running the show, thereby building the argument that the FBI and CIA failed to do an adequate investigation of the assassination.

I'm sure there may have been some slippage but nothing serious enough to cause a serious disagreement between CIA and the FBI.

"On the same day, a cable listing DDP HELMS as the releasing officer was dispatched to CIA stations in Europe and Canada. This cable stated that stations should carefully examine material obtained from a specified sensitive and reliable source, 'because of obvious significance of any scrap of information which bears on (the) assassination issue.' The Desk Officer in charge of the CIA investigation was unaware that such a message had been sent out and was at the time unaware of the sensitive and reliable source mentioned."
[V.29]

Comment: The cable in question is DIRECTOR 85133 written R.T.WALSH, WE/SPO. WH shows on distribution, therefore, "Desk Officer in charge of the CIA investigation" should have seen it. He should also have been aware of the specific source - "Because of obvious significance any scrap information which bears on President's Assassination desire addressee stations screen carefully all audio tapes since 22 November 1963 for comments and cable any significant information so obtained."

"At noon on November 25, 'D', a Latin American, appeared at the American Embassy in Mexico City. [35] He told Embassy personnel that he was in the Cuban consulate on September 17 and saw Cubans who discussed assassination pay Oswald a sum of money. He later repeated his story to the CIA Mexico Station Chief." [V.28]

Comments: a. ALVARADO at no time appeared at the American Embassy - some of our own reporting is inaccurate. According to ALVARADO's interrogation by Mexican authorities, he called the American Embassy on 25 November "and succeeded in speaking to a high official with whom he made an appointment for that same day at 5:30 p.m. near the Hotel Maria Isabel." "Two individuals appeared for the appointment". (NB: According to a note in the Mexico Station files - dated 25 November - these two men were SNIGHT and AC C. PLAMBECK, both were Embassy security officers.

b. During his first meeting with Embassy officials (two security officers), ALVARADO claimed he had been at the Cuban Consulate on the 18th of September, not the 17th. In fact, at no time did he refer to the date 17 September. During the interrogation in connection with the polygraph examination on 6 December 1963,

ALVARADO revealed he was "unsure of the day of week allegedly saw OSWALD. Thinks that it was on Tuesday which would have been 17 September." [MEXI-7289 (IN 75588), 7 December 1963]

c. At no time did ALVARADO repeat his story to the "CIA Mexico Station Chief". ALVARADO first told his story, as indicated above, on 25 November to two officers of the Embassy Security Office. The next day, in the morning, he met with PLAMBECK of the Embassy Security Office, and a Station officer. During the meeting that he evening (26 November), ALVARADO was interrogated by two officers from the Station. [Note for the Record, dated 25 November 1963, signed by PLAMBECK; Memorandum for Clark ANDERSON, Legal Attache, dated 29 November 1963, from Winston M. SCOTT.]

"After OSWALD's return to this country in June 1962, he was interviewed twice by FBI agents; on each occasion he repeatedly lied. He also refused to be polygraphed about his negative answers to questions of ties with Soviet intelligence. Yet the FBI closed the OSWALD security case immediately after the second interview. The case was re-opened in March 1963, but OSWALD was not interviewed by the FBI until August 10, 1963, when he requested an interview after his arrest in New Orleans for disturbing the peace. On the occasion of this third interview, he again repeatedly lied to FBI agents. A month later OSWALD visited Mexico City, where he visited both the Cuban and Soviet diplomatic establishments, and contacted a vice consul at the latter who was in fact a KGB agent."

(V.4)

Comment: It is believed that the Soviet official with whom OSWALD dealt in Mexico City was Consular Attache Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV, born in Moscow, 17 March 1933.

In his letter of 9 November 1963 to the Soviet Consulate in Washington, OSWALD wrote about "his meetings with Comrade KOSTIN [sic] of the Soviet Union in Mexico City, Mexico". There is no official of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico with a name resembling "KOSTIN", other than Consul KOSTIKOV.

KOSTIKOV was the senior officer of five Soviet Consular representatives who dealt with visas and related matters. There is firm evidence for the conclusion that KOSTIKOV is a Soviet State Security (KGB) officer, and the other four Consular officers were also known or strongly suspected to be Soviet State Security personnel serving under official cover.

It must be clearly stated that Soviet intelligence and security officers placed abroad under official cover normally are required to perform the routine and legitimate business demanded by the cover job in an embassy or consulate.

KOSTIKOV was first spotted as a KGB man because of his travels around Mexico, his habitual association with known KGB officers, and because consuls, in Soviet practice, are usually KGB men.

An intensive review of the files of our Mexico City Station was undertaken immediately after the assassination to comb out any previously unreported information about KOSTIKOV's activity. No use-

- 2 -

ful new information bearing upon the assassination resulted from this effort.

A close observation was maintained on the Soviet personnel, KOSTIKOV in particular, for days after 22 November. Nothing unusual or out-of-pattern was noted in the activity or movements of the Soviet personnel.

[From a memorandum, dated 31 January 1964, passed to J. Lee RANKIN of the Warren Commission. See XAAZ-22594 (509-803)]

It is also possible that OSWALD may have spoken to one other Soviet officer, Consul Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV. The following remarks were attributed to YATSKOV in Mexico City regarding Lee Harvey OSWALD:

"I met OSWALD here. He stormed into my office and wanted me to introduce and recommend him to the Cubans. He told me that he had lived in the USSR. I told him that I would have to check before I could recommend him. He was nervous and his hands trembled, and he stormed out of my office. I don't believe that a person as nervous as OSWALD, whose hands trembled could have accurately fired a rifle."

Our Mexican Station checked its records for the period OSWALD was in Mexico City and advised it was quite possible that OSWALD thought he had talked with Valeriy KOSTIKOV when he actually had spoken to YATSKOV; or that he first spoke to KOSTIKOV who turned him over to his superior YATSKOV.

[Memorandum for J. Lee RANKIN, dated 2 July 1964, from Richard HELMS]

According to a memorandum dated 23 May 1975, "There is no increment of credible evidence, applying this phrase strictly, of Soviet and/or Cuban political, intelligence or security service involvement in the assassination to what was developed and considered by the Warren Commission and its staff. The Commission's finding that Lee Harvey OSWALD was the killer of President Kennedy and Officer TIPPIE and did them in alone and of his own determination stands.

"'Credible evidence' that would upset or significantly modify this judgement did (and does) not exist in Washington. But such evidence could exist in Moscow and/or Havana, whose voluntary inputs to the Warren Commission were minimal in quantity and quality,

- 3 -

designed to cover up any admissions of knowledge of, or connection with, OSWALD which might be related directly or indirectly with the assassination. Therefore, the belief that there was Soviet and/or Cuban (KGB and/or DGI) connection with OSWALD will persist and grow until there has been a full disclosure by these governments of all elements of OSWALD's handling and stay in the Soviet Union and his contacts in Mexico City. The Warren Commission report should have left a wider 'window' for this contingency. That, indeed, was the opinion at the working level, particularly in the counterintelligence component in the CIA in 1964. As was indicated by Mr. HELMS in his testimony before the Warren Commission, CIA would continue to regard this aspect of the OSWALD case as still open. [Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Hearings Before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (Washington, 1964), Vol. V., pp. 120-129. See especially p. 124 - "Mr. HELMS: 'Yes. I would assume the case could never be closed.'" [Memorandum for DC/OBS, dated 23 May 1975 from Raymond G. Rocca; Subject: Review of Selected Items in the Lee Harvey OSWALD file Regarding Allegations of the CASTRO Cuban Involvement in the John F. KENNEDY Assassination.]

"Shortly after this meeting with AMLASH, CASTRO issued a public warning reported prominently in the U.S. press about United States' meeting with terrorists who wished to eliminate Cuban leaders. He threatened that Cuba would answer in kind."
[V.3]

On Saturday evening, 7 September 1963, Fidel CASTRO appeared at a Brazilian Embassy reception in Havana; even more unusual, CASTRO submitted to an informal interview by the Associated Press correspondent, Daniel HARKER.

HARKER's interview reached New York on Sunday, 8 September, and was in print throughout the country on Monday, 9 September. There can be no question from the facts surrounding the CASTRO appearance, which had not been expected, and his agreement to the interview, that this event represented a more-than-ordinary attempt to get a message on the record in the United States.

CASTRO's statements to HARKER covered a range of topics but dealt principally with American political leadership, in particular President KENNEDY, whom he excoriated in extraordinarily provocative fashion.

The interview also contained an uncomplimentary reference to Senator GOLDWATER and Cuban delay in signing the limited nuclear test ban. There were differences in the replay by United States newspapers like the New York Times and Washington papers, with a result that CASTRO's "message" was significantly modulated.

In New Orleans, where Lee Harvey OSWALD resided until the middle of September 1963, the HARKER story appeared in the principal morning paper, the Times-Picayune, on Monday, 9 September, page 7, under a three-column headline: "CASTRO Blasts Raids on Cuba. Says Leaders Imperiled by Aid to Rebels". The story followed under the HARKER by-line:

"Havana (AP) - Prime Minister Fidel CASTRO said Saturday night: 'U.S. leaders would be in danger if they helped in any attempt to do away with leaders of Cuba'.

"Bitterly denouncing what he called recent U.S. prompted raids on Cuban territory, Castro said: 'We are prepared to fight them and answer in kind. U.S. leaders should think that if they are aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban

- 2 -

leaders, they themselves will not be safe'.

"... World affairs . . . seemed to be entering a more peaceful climate a few days ago, but now this trend has changed with attacks.

"The U.S. is always ready to negotiate and make promises which later it will not honor. This has happened to promises made during the October crisis. They have broken as can be seen with new attacks.

"But I warn this is leading to a very dangerous situation that could lead to a worse crisis than October's . . ."

The New York Times, in its coverage on 9 September, used a UPI wire service report which omitted any reference to the warning and threat which gave the interview its real significance. The Washington Post did an abbreviated rewrite (9 September, page A-7) which, similarly, omitted any reference to the main thrust of CASTRO's remarks. The Evening Star of Washington, D. C., printed the HARKER story nearly in its entirety in the second section of the paper (9 September 1963, page B-4) and reworded the content of the HARKER interview, placing the emphasis on the political aspects in particular, highlighting the GOLDWATER elements and burying CASTRO's warning to the United States leadership in the middle of the piece.

There is no evidence in the files on the KENNEDY assassination that this CASTRO interview was considered in following up leads or in dealings with the Warren Commission and its staff although Mexico Station specifically directed Headquarters attention to the AP story very shortly after the Dallas killing. More important, the interview appears to have been forgotten in the contemporary political consideration of relations with CASTRO's Cuba. There is no evidence in the Agency records, either, that the Warren Commission staff itself pursued the implication of the CASTRO interview in dealing with the conspiracy hypothesis. There is no evidence in the files that anything along these lines was stated by any other Cuban leader before the assassination.

CASTRO's warning and threat of 7 September 1963 - if OSWALD did indeed read it in New Orleans - must be considered of great significance in the light of the pathological evolution of

- 3 -

OSWALD's passive/aggressive make-up after his attempt to kill General WALKER early in April 1963 and his identification with Fidel CASTRO and the Cuban Revolution which is directly traceable as far back as his Marine Corps service in El Toro, California. CASTRO's warning and threat, given to AP correspondent HARKER, irrespective of whether there was any formal mandate, or even security service contact with OSWALD by the Cubans or the Russians - was an act of singular irresponsibility and under no circumstances was excusable as retorsion for what the Cuban emigres were doing during the summer of 1963.

"The Committee emphasizes that this Report's discussion of investigative deficiencies and the failure of American intelligence agencies to inform the Warren Commission of certain information does not lead to the conclusion that there was a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy.

"Instead, this Report . . . places particular emphasis on the effect their Cuban operations seemed to have on the investigation.

"The Report details these operations to illustrate why they were relevant to the investigation. Thus, the CIA operation involving a high-level Cuban official, code-named AMLASH, is described in order to illustrate why that operation, and its possible ramifications, should have been examined as part of the assassination investigation."

[V.2]

(Yet, in the middle of building its argument, the Committee states that "However, the Committee cautions that it has seen no evidence that Fidel CASTRO or others in the Cuban government plotted President Kennedy's assassination in retaliation for U. S. operations against Cuba.")

"The Committee did not attempt to duplicate the work of the Warren Commission. It did not review the findings and conclusions of the Warren Commission. It did not re-examine the physical evidence which the Warren Commission had."
[V.1]

Comment: This admission is astounding, particularly by a Senate Committee reportedly investigating the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. The remark is obviously not quite correct, for the Committee must have read the Report for they refer to it from time to time; however, they probably did not read the supporting documents.

How Research Was Performed

- 13 -

(4) Identify and describe the records with regard to this activity.

The material relating to Lee Harvey OSWALD (internal Agency documents, reports to and from other government agencies and departments, correspondence with the Warren Commission, etc.) is held in the Agency's official file on OSWALD. The official file no. 201-289248 is held by the CI Staff and comprises 57 volumes, i.e., well over 200 separate file folders and envelopes. In addition to the official file, there are ancillary files covering various aspects of the investigation and later developments - FOIA requests for information, documents (copies) cleared for release in response to such requests, the Rockefeller Commission, etc.

A machine index of the material held in the official file reaches a total of 1829 ~~documents~~ or entries. There is some duplication and omissions. It is not possible to tell from the machine index the subject of many of the documents, particularly cables, nor is it possible to ascertain the origin of many of the documents appearing under those entries marked XAAZ-.

See the attached list of files and folders reviewed ~~to~~
~~date.~~

Components of Official File on Lee Harvey OSWALD

1. Vol. 1 Part 1, undated through 31.10.63
2. Vol. 1 Part 2, 1.11 - 25.11.63
3. Vol. 1 TX-1855, undated
4. Vol. 1 WX-7241, undated
5. Vol. 1 XAAZ-35909, undated
6. Vol. 2 26.11.63
7. Vol. 2 TX-1891, 26.11.63
8. Vol. 3 Part 1, 27.11 - 28.11.63
9. Vol. 3 Part 2, 29.11 - 30.11.63
10. Vol. 3 Part 3, 1.12 - 2.12.63
11. Vol. 3 DBA-63710, 30.11.63
12. Vol. 3 DBA-63711, 2.12.63
13. Vol. 4 3.12.63
14. Vol. 5 4.12 - 7.12.63
15. Vol. 5 XAAZ-35716, 6.12.63 Part 1
16. Vol. 5 XAAZ-35716, 1.12.63 Part 2
17. Vol. 6 8.12 - 9.12.63
18. Vol. 6 DBA-16200, 8.12.63
19. Vol. 7 10.12.63
20. Vol. 8 10.12.63
21. Vol. 8 DBB-11140, 10.12.63
22. Vol. 9 10.12.63
23. Vol. 10 11.12 - 20.12.63
24. Vol. 10 XAAZ-27165, 20.12.63
25. Vol. 11 20.12.63
26. Vol. 12 20.12.63
27. Vol. 13 20.12.63
28. Vol. 14 23.12.63
29. Vol. 15 23.12.63
30. Vol. 16 23.12.63

31. Vol. 16 DBB-15706, 23.12.63
32. Vol. 17 23.12 - 31.12.63
33. Vol. 17 XAAZ-35713, 31.12.63
34. Vol. 18 1.1.64
35. Vol. 18 DBB-11126, 1.1.64
36. Vol. 19 2.1 - 6.1.64
37. Vol. 20 7.1.64
38. Vol. 21 7.1.64
39. Vol. 22 7.1 - 22.1.64
40. Vol. 22 XAAZ-22407, 21.1.64
41. Vol. 23 22.1.64
42. Vol. 24 23.1 - 10.2.64
43. Vol. 24 XAAZ-22409, 25.1.64
44. Vol. 24 XAAZ 22409, 25.1.64
45. Vol. 24 XAAZ-22410, 25.1.64
46. Vol. 24 XAAZ-22411, 5.2.64
47. Vol. 24 XAAZ-22412, 5.2.64
48. Vol. 24 XAAZ-22413, 8.2.64
49. Vol. 24 XAAZ-35908, 2.64
50. Vol. 25 11.2.64
51. Vol. 26 12.2 - 24.2.64
52. Vol. 26 XAAZ 22408, 22.1.64
53. Vol. 27 25.2.64 - 9.3.64
54. Vol. 27 XAAZ-22414, 28.2.64
55. Vol. 27 XAAZ-22415, 28.2.64
56. Vol. 27 XAAZ-22595, 6.3.64
57. Vol. 28 10.3.64
58. Vol. 29 10.3.64
59. Vol. 30 11.3 - 13.3.64
60. Vol. 31 26.3.64

61. Vol. 31 XAAZ-22450, 17.3.64
62. Vol. 32 25.3 - 31.3.64
63. Vol. 32 XAAZ 22416, 26.3.64
64. Vol. 33 1.4 - 7.4.64
65. Vol. 33 XAAZ-22417, 6.4.64
66. Vol. 34 8.4 - 20.4.64
67. Vol. 35 21.4 - 30.4.64
68. Vol. 35 XAAZ-22418, 21.4.64
69. Vol. 35 XAAZ-22419, 24.4.64
70. Vol. 35 XAAZ-22420, 29.4.64
71. Vol. 36 1.5 - 11.5.64
72. Vol. 36 EX-10877, 5.5.64
73. Vol. 36 XAAZ-22421, 6.5.64
74. Vol. 36 XAAZ-22422, 8.5.64
75. Vol. 37 12.5 - 18.5.64
76. Vol. 37 XAAZ-35714, 15.5.64
77. Vol. 38 19.5 - 27.5.64
78. Vol. 38 XAAZ-35610, 21.5.64
79. Vol. 38 XAAZ-35827, 20.5.64
80. Vol. 38 XAAZ-27210, 21.5.64
81. Vol. 39 28.5.64
82. Vol. 40 28.5.64
83. Vol. 41 28.5.64
84. Vol. 42 28.5.64
85. Vol. 43 29.5 - 1.7.64
86. Vol. 43 XAAZ-22423, 3.6.64
87. Vol. 44 2.7.64
88. Vol. 45 2.7.64
89. Vol. 46 3.7 - 11.8.64
90. Vol. 46 XAAZ-22425, 22.7.64

91. Vol. 46 XAAZ-22427, 31.7.64
92. Vol. 47 5.8.64
93. Vol. 48 6.8 - 31.8.64
94. Vol. 48 XAAZ-22428, 7.8.64
95. Vol. 48 XAAZ-22429, 28.8.64
96. Vol. 49 1.9 - 18.9.64
97. Vol. 49 XAAZ-22430, 9.9.64
98. Vol. 49 XAAZ-22431, 10.9.64
99. Vol. 49 XAAZ-22432, 10.9.64
100. Vol. 49 XAAZ-22433, 10.9.64
101. Vol. 49 XAAZ-22434, 10.9.64
102. Vol. 49 XAAZ-22435, 10.9.64
103. Vol. 49 XAAZ-22436, 10.9.64
104. Vol. 49 XAAZ-22437, 11.9.64
105. Vol. 49 XAAZ-22438, 11.9.64
106. Vol. 49 XAAZ-22439, 11.9.64
107. Vol. 49 XAAZ-22440, 11.9.64
108. Vol. 49 XAAZ-22441, 18.9.64
109. Vol. 49 XAAZ-22442, 18.9.64
110. Vol. 49 XAAZ-22443, 18.9.64
111. Vol. 49 XAAZ-22444, 18.9.64
112. Vol. 50 19.9.64
113. Vol. 51 21.9. - 25.11.64
114. Vol. 51 XAAZ-22944, 22.10.64 [Press reaction to Warren
Commission Report]
115. Vol. 52 27.11 - 31.12.64
116. Vol. 52 XAAZ-22598, 25.11.64 ["Unidentified Individual" -
incomplete]
117. Vol. 52 XAAZ-35722, 12.64 [Master List of Warren Commission
correspondence and exhibits] (Unclassified)
118. Vol. 52 XAAZ-35723, 12.64 [Warren Commission Log Book]
(Unclassified)
119. Vol. 53 1.65 - 5.66

- 5 -

120. Vol. 53 XAAZ-22448, 5.5.65 [State Department file]
121. Vol. 53 XAAZ-22449, 5.5.65 [FBI Investigation Report and Exhibits]
122. Vol. 53 XAAZ-22451, 5.5.65 [Copies of FBI documents, Items 1-40]
123. Vol. 53 XAAZ-22452, 5.5.65 [Copies of FBI documents, Items 41-181]
124. Vol. 53 XAAZ-22452, 5.5.65 [Part 1 - duplicate]
125. Vol. 53 XAAZ-22452, 5.5.65 [Part 2 - duplicate]
126. Vol. 53 XAAZ-22453, 5.5.65 [Copies of FBI documents, Items 182-187]
127. Vol. 53 XAAZ-22454, 5.5.65 [News clippings]
128. Vol. 53 XAAZ-22943, 23.3.65 [Part 1, News clippings]
129. Vol. 53 XAAZ 22943, 23.3.65 [Part 2, News clippings]
130. Vol. 53 XAAZ-27164, 2.2.65 [DDP's file on Warren Commission]
131. Vol. 53 SX-24316, 2.8.65 [SE Division soft file]
132. Vol. 54 6.66 - 4.67
133. Vol. 54 DCE-18035, 30.7.65 [Part 1]
134. Vol. 54 DCE-18035, 30.7.65 [Part 2]
135. Vol. 54 DCE-18035, 30.7.65 [Part 3]
136. Vol. 55 1.5.67 - 10.67
137. Vol. 55 XAAZ-22560, 10.7.67
138. Vol. 55 XAAZ-35715, 19.5.67
139. Vol. 56 1.11.67 - 30.12.71
140. Vol. 56 TX-1942, 15.3.68
141. Vol. 56 XAAZ-27163, 17.11.67
142. Vol. 57 1.1.72 -

ADDITIONAL FILES:

<u>Title</u>	<u>No. of vols.</u>
HTLINGUAL Memoranda SIG 568	2
HTLINGUAL (clippings, etc.)	1
OSWALD, SIG 568	4
CI Special Project	1
Record of Action - Warren Commission SIG 950	1
DDP's File [Correspondence to and from Warren Commission](duplicate)	1
Rocca's files (personal)	
NOSENKO handling	1
Dealings with Warren Commission	1
HOCH Letter	2
CASTRO Interview, 7 September 1963	1
Mexico Chrono Record	1
Unidentified Individual Report	1
Unnamed file	2
Rockefeller Commission; notes re- garding Warren Commission	1
Mexico City Station Files	6
OGC files (correspondence to Rockefeller Commission)	9
CI staff file (Rocca - Hartman)	3
Master File Released Documents (FOIA) 1st series (released 2/3 1975)	
File (copies) of Released Documents (FOIA) Second Series Released September 1976	10

(1) What Collection requirements were issued to the field with regard to Kennedy's assassination?

As soon as the name of Lee OSWALD was mentioned in connection with the assassination of President Kennedy on 22 November, CIA file checks were begun and the Mexico City Station was asked by cable for more information on OSWALD. Within a week twenty-seven cabled reports had been sent to the White House, the Department of State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

CIA field stations provided bits of information during the week after the assassination. The Mexico City Station reviewed the transcripts of its telephone taps and came up with several more conversations probably involving OSWALD, but not actually mentioning him by name; these transcripts connected him also to the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City. Several Mexicans were arrested and questioned about his activities, giving a good picture of what he was really up to. A host of fabricators, some anonymous, bombarded overseas embassies with spurious tips on the case. All of these leads were soon discredited, but they were still coming in.

In light of OSWALD's defection to the Soviet Union where he had remained for almost three years and his trip to Mexico City where he had contact with members of the Cuban and Soviet Consulates, the possibility that OSWALD had not acted upon his own but may have been an agent in a plot under foreign direction could not be dismissed without exhaustive exploitation of all available foreign assets.

As the Agency responsible for the collection of foreign counterintelligence information, it was the Agency's responsibility to support the Federal Bureau of Investigation in its investigation of the President's assassination by

- a. Obtaining detailed information on every aspect of OSWALD's activities and movements abroad;
- b. Studying this information in light of the Agency's knowledge of the mission and operations of foreign intelligence services - particularly the Cuban and Soviet services, and

c. Making available to the FBI and other appropriate government agencies and departments, all information obtained on OSWALD or pertaining to his contacts with Cuban and Soviet officials and organizations abroad.

Set out below are those actions taken by the Agency after learning the identity of the assassin and during the weeks immediately following the President's death.

Specific Action Taken by the Agency

On the same day as the assassination, 22 November 1963, the Deputy Director, Plans, Richard HELMS, sent a cable book message to all CIA Stations abroad. HELMS stated that the "tragic death of President Kennedy requires all of us to look sharp for any unusual intelligence developments. Although we have no reason to expect anything of a particular military nature, all hands should be on the quick alert at least for the next few days while the new President takes over." [DIR 84608]

On 22 November, the Chief of WH/3, in response to an earlier cable from Mexico City in which the latter directed Headquarters' attention to previous traffic relating to Lee Harvey OSWALD [MEXI-7014 (IN 66781), 22 November 1963], asked the Station to follow and report on Soviet Embassy activity and reaction "during these hours!" [DIR 84802]

On 23 November, CI Staff requested the Mexico City Station to review all audio tapes and transcripts since 27 September to locate material possibly pertinent to OSWALD. [DIR 84886 in reference to MEXI-6453 (IN 36017), 9 October 1963.]

On the same day, Chief, WH/3, asked Mexico City Station to cable verbatim transcripts in English of all OSWALD intercepts and other material relating to him. [DIR 84914]

On 24 November, Chief, WH/3, asked the Mexico City Station's opinion as to why OSWALD was in Mexico in September-October 1963. [DIR 84920]

On 25 November, Chief, WH/3, asked Mexico City Station to

cable a summary of all the Station's information relating to Silvia DURAN (Mexican employee of the Cuban Consulate, Mexico City).

[DIR 84926]

On the same day, Chief, WH/3, asked the Mexico City Station for any information indicating that OSWALD may have entered Mexico at any time other than during the period 26 September to 5 October.

[DIR 84938]

On 26 November 1963, Headquarters sent a priority cable to Brussels, Copenhagen, Helsinki, London, Madrid, Oslo, Ottawa, Paris, Rome, and The Hague requesting station and liaison traces on Lee Harvey OSWALD. [DIR 85133]

On 28 November 1963, Chief, WH/3, stressed in a cable to the Mexico City Station that "there should be no let down in your effort to follow all leads and investigate all facts which bear on this case. We have by no means excluded the possibility that other as yet unknown persons may have been involved or even that other powers may have played a role." Chief, WH/3 added the request "Please continue all your coverage of Soviet and Cuban installations and your liaison with Mexicans." [DIR 85655]

On 29 November, Headquarters forwarded a book cable to Copenhagen, Helsinki, London, Oslo, and The Hague which included

- 11 -

a synopsis for COS background briefings to assist in the evaluation of any operational leads generated by the investigation.

[DIR 85817]

A second cable was sent out on the same day to Frankfurt and The Hague asking for evidence of travel of Lee OSWALD and his Russian-born wife during their return to the United States during May and June 1962. [DIR 85973]

On 2 December, headquarters sent a priority cable to Berlin, Bonn, Frankfurt, and The Hague asking for confirmatory information relating to the travel of OSWALD, his wife, and oldest child on their return from the Soviet Union (in 1962) to the United States. [DIR 86077].

On 12 December 1963, Chief, WH/3, asked Mexico City Station to continue to watch for Soviet and Cuban reaction to the investigation of the President's assassination, evidence of their complicity, and signs that they were putting out propaganda about the case. Mention was made that Soviet intelligence officers in India had letters sent to American leaders demanding a full investigation of the assassination. [DIR 88680]

(2) What follow-up of these requirements was there during 1964?

(3) What form did the follow-up take?

The initial response to headquarters' requirements levied on the field, after the assassination of the President, has been treated under Question (1) above. As this information was received in Headquarters it was compared with existing information, if any, synthesized, analyzed, and then made available to the White House, the Department of State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Copies of these dissemination were also forwarded to the Secret Service.

Headquarters examined all new leads sent in by the field, offering guidance, and, when necessary, coordinating with the appropriate United States government agency - primarily the FBI - when the investigation involved an American citizen. Most, if not all, leads originating in the field were persons claiming to have knowledge of OSWALD or his wife. Investigation revealed that the majority of these leads were fabricators.

In light of the urgency of the investigation being conducted by the FBI, all correspondence between Agency Headquarters and its field units was in cable form. If necessary, messages could be passed by telephone.

Agency field representatives in the Mexico City Station and the Miami Base worked closely with the local FBI representative keeping the latter continually apprised of all information pertaining to the investigation as it became available, ~~to the Station~~. The Mexico City Station and Miami Base were able to respond immediately to requirements levied by the local FBI representative. The field reported to Headquarters on all information passed in the field to the FBI or received from the FBI representative so that Headquarters could make a formal dissemination to the appropriate government agency or department in Washington.

(5) What reporting was there from the field in response to Headquarters' requirements?

SECTION I

Responses to the cables listed under Question (1) above are given below under each cable.

DIR 84608, 22 November 1963

Response: On 23 November the London Station stated that Headquarters' alert had been passed to the British services - [] and []

The latter service told our London Station it was alerting its field stations. [LOND-6038 (IN 67061)]

~~Comment: This response was the only one which specifically made reference to DIR 84608; however, the latter cable undoubtedly sparked Headquarters components, Headquarters personnel on TDY abroad, and field units to react immediately. Examples are to be found in a separate section to this question.~~

DIR 84886, 23 November 1963

Response: Mexico City Station sent three cables on 23 November containing the texts of seven telephone calls believed to be relative to OSWALD. (Later it was determined that two of the telephone calls believed to have been made by OSWALD had been made by some other unidentified person.) [MEXI-7023 (IN 67108), MEXI-7025 (IN 67188), and MEXI 7033 (IN 67232).]

DIR 84914, 23 November 1963

Response: The three cables cited above may be considered as a response to this cable.

DIR 84920, 24 November 1963

live

Response: The only source of information on the reasons for OSWALD's trip to Mexico City was Silvia DURAN, a Mexican employee of the Cuban Consulate, who was detained on 23 November and questioned by Mexican authorities from 23 to 25 November. Mexico City Station had already alerted Headquarters to DURAN's arrest and had forwarded information in several cables, particularly MEXI-7046

- 15 -

on 24 November 1963. Mexico City responded to DIR 84920 with MEXI-7054 on 24 November 1963. This cable contained additions or amendments to MEXI-7046. (In addition to information obtained from Silvia DURAN contained in her file, see also the review of selected items in the Lee Harvey OSWALD file regarding allegations of the CASTRO Cuban involvement in the John F. Kennedy assassination, dated 23 May 1975.)

DIR 84926, 25 November 1963

Response: Mexico City Station cabled all Station held information regarding Silvia DURAN in MEXI-7065.

DIR 84938, 25 November 1963DIR 85133, 26 November 1963

a. On 27 November, Helsinki reported on OSWALD's presence in Helsinki from 10 to 15 October 1959. [HELS-2299 (IN 68739)]

b. On 27 November, Rome reported on Station traces; liaison traces were to follow. [ROME-1233 (IN 68802)]

c. On 27 November, Ottawa reported no traces in Station or liaison files. [OTTA 1275 (IN 69005)]

d. On 27 November, Copenhagen forwarded a negative report [COPE 3469 (IN 69011)]

e. On 27 November, London Station reported that the "Traffic Index" showed that OSWALD had arrived in Southampton on 9 October 1959; he left the following day by air for Helsinki. [LOND 6097 (IN 69100)]

f. On 27 November, Ottawa Station sent a second cable containing information on the initial reaction of the Cuban Ambassador CRUZ and his staff to the report of the assassination. After further information was received (by the Cubans) that OSWALD had connections with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, there was some apprehension concerning possible United States reaction. [OTTA 1277 (IN 69233)]

g. On 27 November, Oslo Station cabled a response that there were no traces on OSWALD in Station or liaison files. [OSLO 4490 (IN 69290)]

h. On 28 November, the Madrid Station replied that there was no information in Station or liaison files. (MADR 9789 (IN 69328))

i. On 29 November, the Brussels Station stated there were no traces on OSWALD. [BRUS 8739 (IN 69852)]

j. On 29 November, the Rome Station reported no liaison traces on OSWALD. (ROME 1258 (IN 70111))

k. On 5 December, the Paris Station reported that Station and liaison traces were negative. [PARI 1770 (IN 74234)]

l. On 10 December, the Paris Station reported that the French press was giving sensational coverage to the possibility that the assassination was "a many-angled plot". [PARI 1853 (IN 77148)]

BIR 85817, 29 November 1963

DIR 85973, 29 November 1963

- 17 -

DIR 86077, 2 December 1963

a. On 4 December, the Bonn Base forwarded information regarding Marina OSWALD's entry into Germany at Helmstedt on 3 June 1962. She left Germany the same day at Bentheim. Marina OSWALD was traveling on a West German visa no. 694/62, issued by the West German Embassy in Moscow. [BONN-5579 (IN 73338)] (Copies of the documents referring to Marina OSWALD were forwarded to Headquarters as an attachment to EGNT-1400, 9 December 1963.

b. On 6 December, the Munich Base cabled a negative reply. [MUNI-8316 (IN 75065)]

c. On 4 December, The Hague Station cabled information that M(arina) OSWALD entered the Netherlands on 3 June 1962 at the Oldenzal border point. [HAGU-5110 (IN 73378)]

d. On 9 December, the Stuttgart Base replied that the Base had no confirmatory information relating to OSWALD's travel. [STUT-5545 (IN 76758)]

SECTION II

In addition to specific action taken by the Agency as given above, Headquarters components, Headquarters personnel on TDY, and field units reacted as shown below:

a. On 22 November, Mexico City Station directed Headquarters' attention to previous traffic relating to Lee Harvey OSWALD and asked for a photograph of OSWALD in order to compare it with available photographs in the Station which might be of the assassin. The Station indicated that it was forwarding as soon as possible copies of a photograph of the only visitor to the Soviet Embassy on 28 [sic - 1] October who could [might] be identical with OSWALD. [MEXI-7014 (IN 66781)]

A subsequent cable sent the same day from Mexico City indicated that the Station had photographs of the same unidentified American (referred to in the above cable) who is possibly OSWALD entering the Cuban Embassy on 15 October. [MEXI-7019 (IN 66846)]

b. On 22 November, the Agency's Station in Miami reported

that OSWALD of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee had participated in a debate in August 1963 on the New Orleans radio station, WDSU.

OSWALD was a former Marine who had gone to Moscow in 1959 where he renounced his American citizenship. [WAVE-8049 (IN 66782)]

c. On 23 November, the Chief, SR/CI forwarded a memorandum to the Assistant Deputy Director, Plans, in which the latter's attention was drawn to the fact that OSWALD had been in contact on 28 September 1963 with Soviet Consul Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV. According to current information available to SR/CI, KOSTIKOV was a known KGB officer and considered to be a member of the KGB's Thirteenth Department/ of the First Chief Directorate. According to the FBI liaison officer, the FBI had reason to believe that OSWALD's visit was to get Soviet support for a United States passport or visa matter. Chief, SR/CI closed by saying that he had reported OSWALD's connections with a known member of the Thirteenth Department to the FBI liaison officer at 1030 hours on 23 November 1963.

[Memorandum for ADDP, 23 November 1963 (file no. SX-25550)]

d. On 23 November, the Mexico City Station forwarded to Headquarters the names of three persons who had flown from Mexico to the United States, during the first twelve days of November, who might have been identical with Lee Harvey OSWALD. [MEXI-7020 (IN 66891)]

e. On 24 November, the Mexico City Station reported to Headquarters that the United States Consulate in Nuevo Laredo had information that OSWALD had entered Mexico at Nuevo Laredo on 26 September traveling on Mexican Tourist Card no. 24085 and had left Mexico by auto [sic] on 3 October 1963 at Nuevo Laredo. [MEXI-7040 (IN 67261)]

f. On 24 November, the Chief, SR/CI, forwarded a memorandum to the Assistant Deputy Director, Plans, in which he quoted a cable sent by Chief, SR Division, who was, at that time, in Frankfurt. The latter asked the question if OSWALD was not unwittingly or wittingly a part of a plot to murder the President in Dallas as an attempt to exacerbate further sectional strife and render the United States Government less capable of dealing with Soviet initiatives

- 19 -

over the next year. The Chief of SR continued by suggesting that if AELADLE's (Anatoliy Mikhaylovich GOLITSYN) views on (Harold)

WILSON and the information noted in paragraph 1c below have any substance (and they cannot be ignored), this suggests that we can expect major Soviet pressures over the next several months, for which the Soviets have made careful, long-range preparations.

Paragraph 1a:

"Within minutes of the first news, Moscow radio statements as heard in London attributed the assassination to 'right-wing elements'. Only as the true identity of the believed assassin became known did Moscow begin to complain that United States reactionnaires were using OSWALD as a pawn."

Paragraph 1b:

"Should not the assignment of 13th Department officers to the KGB Residency in the United Nations in New York be considered in a new light?"

Paragraph 1c:

"I discovered from ~~Arthur~~ MARTIN (MI-5) during our long and exceptionally valuable discussions, that one of Harold WILSON's principal scientific advisers is Captain Ian MAXWELL, who has a long Soviet intelligence background. This may shed new light on AELADLE's report, i.e., that Harold WILSON may be a Soviet agent."

Chief, SR/CI, pointed out that the SR Chief's comments come without benefit of traces passed earlier to the ADDP showing that OSWALD had contact with a 13th Department representative in Mexico-City. Chief, SR/CI, ended by indicating that another recently arrived cable suggests that OSWALD's business with the Soviet Consul was connected with his own visa to the USSR and Cuba and may, therefore, have been . . . innocent. [Memorandum for ADDP, 24 November 1963 (file no. SX-25598)]

g. On 24 November, the Agency's Station in Miami reported information received from the local FBI representative. The latter

had received a request from his Headquarters to ascertain the veracity, including sources, of a statement made by DRE leader, Jose LLANUSA Gobel, to the effect that Fidel CASTRO had threatened lives of United States leaders in the event of United States aggression against Cuba. LLANUSA attributed the above threats to Fidel CASTRO who made these remarks during a reception in early September 1963 at the Brazilian Embassy in Havana. [WAVE-8133 (IN 67394)]

h. On 25 November 1963, the Mexico City Station also called Headquarters' attention to an AP story datelined Havana, 7 September 1963. At a reception held at the Brazilian Embassy, CASTRO is quoted as haveing said: "We are prepared to fight them and answer in kind. United States leaders shouldthink [sic - consider ?] that if they are aiding terrorist plans to eleminate the Cuban leaders, they themselves will not be safe." [MEXI-7055 (IN 67620)]